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Abstract: 
Ongoing tax reform processes, competitive pressures and the consequences of the financial and 
sovereign debt crisis have considerably shaped the tax systems of the Member States of the 
European Union in the last two decades. Our paper combines a qualitative and quantitative 
analysis of the development of European tax structures based on a unique and comprehensive 
dataset for the EU-25 Member States between 1998 and 2015. Especially among the EU-15 
Member States, we still find evidence for the often-cited trend of tax rate cut cum tax base 
broadening. In this context, we identify interest deduction limitation rules and loss provisions 
as main drivers of tax base broadening. Furthermore, the quantitative analysis of effective tax 
burden scenarios shows that Member States seem to additionally rely on an increased taxation 
of dividends to balance possible revenue losses associated with reduced corporate income tax 
rates. 
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1. Introduction 
Issues in corporate taxation have definitely gained prominence during the last decade. Ever 
more new reports about low tax payments of highly profitable multinational corporations have 
initiated internationally coordinated ambitious corporate tax reform projects: Both the Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) package of the OECD as well as the Action Plan of the 
European Commission aim at overcoming current deficits in corporate taxation and at making 
tax systems more sustainable for current challenges such as globalisation and digitalisation.1 
Globalisation has not only led to an increased mobility of enterprises, but has likewise 
intensified the competitive pressure for countries to establish an attractive environment for 
investments of multinational corporations which is – among others – also influenced by the 
attractiveness of the corporate tax system.2 This is especially true within the European Union 
(EU) as direct taxation is one of few policy areas that remains within the sole national 
responsibility of each Member State.3 Several empirical studies found an increased tax 
competition within the EU in comparison to other world regions,4 which is also illustrated by 
current suspicions that certain Member States have illicitly granted specific tax incentives to 
single multinational corporations.5 
Moreover, the EU faced several macroeconomic challenges in recent years with the economic 
crisis in 2008/2009 and the sovereign debt crisis from 2010 onwards. Both crises also impacted 
corporate tax policies in the Member States: During the economic crisis, many Member States 
introduced temporary tax measures to alleviate the consequences for enterprises.6 The sovereign 
debt crisis led to increased fiscal needs of Member States, which changed their corporate tax 
system voluntarily, or on request of international institutions to receive financial support. 
The ongoing reform processes, the increasing globalisation and the crises had and continue to 
have a large influence on corporate tax policy in the EU. With our paper, we generally aim at a 
review and an analysis of the development of corporate tax systems in the Member States. 
Existing related studies mostly found a declining trend in corporate tax rates and broader tax 
bases (“tax rate cut cum tax base broadening”).7 However, these studies predominantly only 
                                                 
1 See OECD (2013); OECD (2015a),; European Commission (2015), 
2 See for instance Owens (1993), pp. 23-28; Bond (2000), pp. 171-174; Fuest/Hemmelgarn (2005), p. 509; 
Egger/Raff (2015), p. 778. 
3 See for instance Cnossen (2001), p. 479; Devereux (2008), p. 628.  
4 See Davies/Voget (2008); Crabbé (2013); Devereux/Loretz (2013).  
5 See European Commission (2016b). 
6 See Spengel/Zinn (2011), pp. 13-15. 
7 See for instance Devereux et al. (2002); Griffith/Klemm (2004); Devereux (2007); Loretz (2008); 
Kawano/Slemrod (2016).   
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consider distinct OECD countries, cover a time horizon from the 1980s up to at best 2008 and 
assess the development of the corporate tax base only by depreciation rules for single assets. 
We aim to close this gap by providing for a detailed qualitative and quantitative analysis of tax 
structures in the EU between 1998 and 2015. With the qualitative analysis, we try to ascertain 
whether the trend of tax rate cut cum tax base broadening is still of relevance today and which 
channels are in use from 1998 through 2015. More specifically, we will extend existing 
literature in four important ways: First, as existing studies only considered single countries 
among the OECD Member States, we are the first to provide for a comprehensive overview on 
the development of tax structures for the EU Member States over a long period.8 Second, we 
extend previous studies with regard to time as we consider the time period until 2015. This 
allows to include the developments of corporate income tax structures after the economic and 
sovereign debt crisis as well as first possible consequences of the international tax reform 
packages. Third, we provide for a much more detailed analysis of corporate tax base 
provisions:9 Especially in the present low-interest environment, the interest and liquidity 
advantages of depreciation rules are less important.10 In contrast, interest deduction limitation 
rules or limits to loss compensation might fully impede the deduction of business expenses and 
could therefore have much severe consequences.11 Additionally, we also consider the 
development of other relevant corporate taxes such as the German trade tax. Fourth, we take 
the development of shareholder taxation (dividend income) as a possible further channel of 
financing corporate tax rate cuts into account. As shareholder taxation is especially relevant for 
small and medium-sized enterprises that are also less mobile than multinational corporations,12 
there might be incentives for Member States to attract comparatively mobile multinational 
enterprises by means of low corporate income tax rates and to compensate associated revenue 
losses through an increased dividend taxation of shareholders.13 
The qualitative analysis is based on a comprehensive and hand-collected examination of the 
database of the International Bureau for Fiscal Documentation (IBFD), the IBFD’s annual 
                                                 
8 See for instance Clausing (2007); Devereux (2007); Kawano/Slemrod (2016). 
9 Despite a few exceptions, existing studies have predominantly only focused on depreciation rules. See for instance 
Devereux et al. (2002), pp. 457-460; Loretz (2008), pp. 645-647; Becker/Fuest (2011), pp. 581-583; Bond/Xing 
(2015), pp. 17-19. As an exception, Kawano/Slemrod (2016) provide for a very detailed description of tax base 
definitions. 
10 See Spengel/Meier (2016), p. 498; Spengel et al. (2016a), p. 10. 
11 See Spengel et al. (2010), p. 19.  
12 See Sørensen (1995), p. 292. For corresponding Sweden-based empirical studies, see Edmark/Gordon (2013); 
Alstadsæter/Jacob (2016). According to the classical model of tax competition, it is assumed that the tax burden 
increasingly switches to immobile rather than mobile factors, see Bucovetsky/Wilson (1991); Zodrow (2010). 
13 This is currently discussed in the United States, see Grubert/Altshuler (2016). 
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European Tax Handbooks from 1998 through 2015 and additional sources.14 For reasons of 
clarity, our analysis is limited to the tax structures of the EU-25 Member States. This allows to 
analyse structural differences between the Member States among two subgroups, namely the 
EU-15 (Member States with accession date until 2004) and EU-10 (accession date in 2004).15 
Since we focus on the development of tax structures within the EU, the EU-10 Member States 
will only be considered from their accession date onwards.16 Moreover, the tax data collection 
has been limited to the years 1998, 2002 and, after the accession of the EU-10 Member States, 
to two-year intervals (i.e. 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2015).  
With the qualitative analysis of corporate tax base rules, it is possible to roughly estimate a tax 
base broadening or tax base narrowing effect. The overall consequences for the effective tax 
burden of corporations (development of tax base and tax rate) can only be measured by a 
quantitative analysis. As we consider multiple changes in corporate tax bases and other taxes 
that are relevant for the effective tax burden of corporations, it is necessary to use a simulation 
tool which allows such a detailed consideration of tax rules. Therefore, the quantitative analysis 
will be conducted with the European Tax Analyzer which allows for an exact quantification of 
the effects of single changes in tax base provisions and further incorporates other (profit) taxes 
at corporate level. Additionally, the taxation of shareholders can be taken into account as well. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The qualitative analysis is conducted in 
sections 2 to 4. Section 2 analyses the developments in corporate income tax bases and rates 
among the EU Member States. Subsequently, Section 3 and Section 4 extend the analysis to 
significant other corporate-level taxes and the taxation of dividends at shareholder level to 
evaluate other possible revenue channels. Subsequently, the results of the quantitative tax 
burden comparisons are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Development of Corporate Income Tax Structures in the EU 
For the development of tax structures in EU, we first consider trends in corporate tax bases. 
Along with the subsequent analysis of the developments in corporate income tax rates, we aim 
                                                 
14 Further important sources of information were Endres et al. (2007); Spengel/Zöllkau (2012); Endres/Spengel 
(2015); Spengel et al. (2016b).  
15 We assume the simultaneous accession of ten Member States in 2004 to have a significant impact on European 
tax structures. Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia that joined the Union in later years (2007 and 2013) will not be part 
of the analysis.  
16 For the EU-10 Member States, several studies have revealed strong declines in effective corporate tax rates prior 
to the accession to the EU, see for instance Bellak et al. (2009), pp. 272-273; Overesch/Wamser (2010), p. 430; 
Genschel et al. (2011), p. 591.  
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to ascertain whether the trend of tax rate cut cum tax base broadening is still persistent in single 
Member States until 2015. 
 
2.1. Trends in Corporate Tax Bases 
Any analysis of the development of corporate tax base rules cannot be exhaustive as the tax 
base determination is a highly complex process. In previous literature, tax base broadening and 
narrowing has mainly been measured by the development of depreciation rules only. Despite 
the analysis of tax structures in several OECD countries by Kawano/Slemrod (2016), there is 
no comprehensive overview on the development of other tax base rules in the EU.  
Due to its high relevance in prior literature, our analysis begins with the development of 
depreciation rules from 1998 to 2015. Subsequently, we consider rules for the valuation of 
inventory, interest deduction limitation rules, loss compensation provisions, notional interest 
deductions and the deductibility of other taxes. Based on a comprehensive analysis of all these 
tax base elements, it is possible to determine whether and how tax bases have become broader 
over time in a much more precise way as compared to previous literature. 
 
2.1.1. Depreciation Rules 
In existing literature, the base broadening effect of different depreciation methods has usually 
been measured by the present value of depreciation allowances.17 In contrast, our analysis is 
exclusively limited to the prevalence of different depreciation methods in the EU-25 Member 
States. By focusing only on the depreciation method itself, it is still possible to draw conclusions 
on whether tax bases become broader due to changes in the depreciation provisions. In addition, 
the heterogeneity of the depreciation methods used in the Member States can be analysed. In 
general, the straight line, accelerated, declining balance, immediate and pool depreciation 
method as well as a complete denial of depreciation allowances can be distinguished. In the 
following, we will consider the development of depreciation methods for five different assets: 
business equipment, patents, machinery as well as office and factory buildings.18 
                                                 
17 The calculation of the present value of depreciation allowances is usually based on the economic assumptions of 
Devereux et al. (2002), p. 458. 
18 The economic lifetime is assumed to be 4 years for business equipment, 5 years for patents, 5 years for machinery 
as well as 50 years for office and factory buildings. 
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Although the precise advantageousness of single depreciation rules depends on their specific 
design in terms of annual depreciation rates, it is nonetheless possible to draw some general 
conclusions on the favourability of certain methods: Immediate depreciation is most favourable 
from a tax perspective whereas the denial of depreciation is least favourable due to the full 
non-deductibility of acquisition costs. The straight line method allows only constant annual 
depreciation charges. The accelerated, declining balance and pool method usually result in 
higher depreciation rates during the first years. Therefore, the associated present value of 
depreciation allowances is regularly lower for the straight line method that – from a tax 
perspective – is thus considered as less favourable than the accelerated, declining balance and 
pool method. Higher depreciation allowances in the first years of the economic lifetime of an 
asset lead to positive interest and liquidity effects. Under the declining balance method, a 
constant depreciation rate is applied to the residual book value. In order to fully depreciate the 
asset, this method normally includes a switch to the straight line method. In contrast, the pool 
method does not allow for such a switch and the asset is thus in theory never fully depreciated. 
To further rank the accelerated, declining balance or pool method of depreciation, more 
information on their specific design such as the exact depreciation rate is required. In sum, the 
above depreciation methods can be classified into four categories of tax favourability as shown 
in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Overview on the Tax Advantageousness of Single Depreciation Methods 
 
Most Member States allow more than one method for the depreciation of an asset. Our 
subsequent considerations are limited to the depreciation method that is most favourable from 
a tax perspective. The development of depreciation methods for the different kinds of assets is 
illustrated in Figure 2 below for the EU-15 (upper line) as well as EU-10 Member States (lower 
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line) from 1998 through 2015.19 In each graph, the percentage amount of Member States that 
allow a specific depreciation method is shown for the different types of assets.20  
Figure 2: Prevalence of Depreciation Methods across Asset Types 
 
As regards the development of the provisions for the depreciation of office and factory 
buildings, the straight line method is most common among the EU-15. Only two changes can 
be observed for the depreciation of factory buildings from 1998 to 2015: On the one hand, 
accelerated depreciation is temporarily granted in Austria in 2002. On the other hand, the 
depreciation of such buildings is disallowed from 2011 on in the United Kingdom and thereby 
aligned to the treatment of office buildings. Similarly, Denmark, Ireland and Malta deny any 
depreciation of office buildings throughout the whole observation period. Among the EU-10, 
four different methods are in use for the depreciation of real property. The only change occurs 
                                                 
19 In case a change in depreciation method occurs, we only consider the change in the next year for which data are 
captured, i.e. a change in 1999 will be recorded in 2002.  
20 In Estonia, profit determination rules are not relevant since corporate income tax is solely based on the amount of 
distributed profits; retained profits are subject to tax at a rate of 0%. Therefore, for the EU-10, only nine Member 
States are considered. 
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in 2015 in the Slovak Republic where office buildings have to be depreciated according to the 
straight line method instead of by the accelerated depreciation method. 
For other fixed assets such as machinery and business equipment, a broader mandatory 
application of the straight line method can be observed in Germany (2011), Greece (2013) and 
Italy (2002 for business equipment, 2009 for machinery). In 2009, accelerated depreciation is 
temporarily available in Austria.21 Among the EU-10, the only change occurs in Poland where 
the declining balance method is abolished in 2007. Whereas the straight line method has always 
been the most common method from 2005 through 2015 among the EU-10, this is only the case 
from 2013 on among the EU-15. 
Most Member States require the depreciation of patents according to the straight line method. 
There is almost no variation throughout the observation period. Only among the EU-15, the use 
of the straight line method is strengthened by a switch from the declining balance to the straight 
line method in the United Kingdom in 2011 and by the temporary availability of an accelerated 
depreciation scheme in Austria in 2009. 
In sum, we find only limited evidence for tax base broadening by switches to a less favourable 
depreciation method across different kinds of assets. The constant high prevalence of straight 
line depreciation confirms the results of previous studies that found limited changes regarding 
depreciation methods and present values of depreciation since the 1990s.22 Especially in several 
of the EU-15 Member States, however, the prevalence of the already widespread straight line 
depreciation is further strengthened. It is interesting to see that the tax base broadening 
tendencies have especially occurred since 2009 during a period which has not yet been subject 
to analysis in previous studies. 
                                                 
21 At the same time, a switch from an accelerated depreciation to the use of the straight line method occurs in Italy 
such that the percentage of countries allowing accelerated depreciation remains constant. 
22 See Devereux et al. (2002), p. 459; Bond/Xing (2015), p. 19. 
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Figure 3: Prevalence and Development of Further Elements of Tax Base Definition 
 
 
2.1.2. Valuation of Inventory 
Generally, the LIFO (Last In First Out), FIFO (First In First Out) and the average cost method 
can be distinguished for the valuation of inventory. The use of the LIFO method is most tax 
beneficial in case factor prices increase since higher production costs are attributed to the goods 
sold. Moreover, the average cost method is more favourable than the FIFO method from a tax 
perspective. Again, as for the case of depreciation, taxpayers may usually choose between 
several options for the valuation of inventory within a country. In the following, we consider 
only the most tax efficient method. 
Similar to the case of depreciation, the left graph in Figure 3 above presents the prevalence of 
different valuation methods across Member States. As evident from Figure 3, the use of the 
LIFO method has become less popular among both the EU-15 and EU-10 Member States. With 
Spain (2009), Portugal (2011) and Greece (2015) as well as Slovenia (2009) and Hungary 
(2013), five more Member States prescribe the use of the average cost method for the valuation 
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of inventory, which indicates a tendency towards base broadening. The number of Member 
States that only allow the use of the FIFO method remains constant. 
 
2.1.3. Interest Deduction Limitation Rules 
Existing corporate income tax systems systematically favor debt over equity financing due to 
the deductibility of interest expenses whereas there is no similar relief for dividends as the cost 
of equity.23 For multinational corporations, cross-border debt financing is an important channel 
to exploit international tax rate differentials, which further strengthens the incentive to use debt 
financing.24 Hence, interest deduction limitation rules are not only considered as a means to 
achieve broader corporate tax bases, but – especially during recent years – have been used as 
instruments to limit cross-border shifting of taxable income.25 
Member States follow two main approaches to limit an excessive tax deductibility of interest 
expenses: Under a fixed ratio approach, the deductibility of interest is restricted in case a firm’s 
debt to asset ratio exceeds a certain safe harbor threshold whereas an earnings stripping rule 
limits the deductible part of excessive interest in relation to a profit figure such as EBITDA.26 
Since profit measures are much more volatile than balance sheet items, earnings stripping rules 
are considered to be stricter than a fixed ratio approach.27 Several Member States apply further 
limitations to interest deductibility such as rather liberal administrative guidelines derived from 
jurisprudence. In the following analysis, only legal written rules in the tax laws of a country 
will be considered.  
As it can be seen from the changes in the prevalence of the different types of interest deduction 
limitation rules in the second graph of Figure 3, there is an increasing tendency towards the 
introduction of earnings stripping rules starting in 2007 especially among the EU-15 Member 
States. Denmark was the first Member State to introduce such provisions in addition to an 
existing fixed ratio rule that has been implemented in 2002. Subsequently, seven other Member 
                                                 
23 See de Mooij (2011); Feld et al. (2013) for an overview of empirical studies on the impact of the so-called debt 
bias on corporate financing choices. In a few Member States, the debt bias is (partially) mitigated and the treatment 
of equity is adjusted to that of debt financing as a deduction for the notional return on equity is granted. The 
concept and prevalence of such notional interest deduction is elaborated in more detail in section 2.1.5. 
24 See, for instance, Desai et al. (2004); Mintz/Weichenrieder (2010). 
25 When interest deduction limitation rules were first introduced in Germany in 1994, for instance, one of the main 
objectives was to contribute to maintaining the level of tax revenue after a reduction of the statutory corporate 
income tax rate, see Bundesrat Drucksache 1/93, dated 04.01.1993. In 2008, interest deduction limitation rules 
were adjusted with the deliberate aim to limit cross-border debt shifting. For the history of German interest 
deduction limitation rules, see Ruf/Schindler (2015), pp. 22-24. 
26 See Endres/Spengel (2015), pp. 368-370. 
27 See OECD (2015b), p. 43. 
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States introduced an earnings stripping rule. The number of EU-15 Member States that apply 
general interest deduction limitation rules increases to nine until 2015.28 Belgium is the only 
EU-15 Member State that applies a fixed ratio approach throughout the whole observation 
period. 
Among the EU-10 Member States, there is no evidence for a similar development. Here, the 
fixed ratio approach is more common and is used in four EU-10 Member States from 2005 
through 2015. Except for Poland where the safe harbor threshold is tightened from a debt-to-
equity-ratio of 3:1 to a ratio of 1:1 in 2015,29 Member States do not implement changes to 
existing interest deduction limitation rules. In the subgroup of the EU-10 Member States, only 
the Slovak Republic newly introduces an earnings stripping rule in 2015. Thus far, it is the only 
EU-10 Member State with a profit-based limitation on interest deductibility. 
The effects of interest deduction limitation rules could be alleviated to a certain extent in case 
Member States allow for a carry forward of non-deductible interest. Except for France and the 
Slovak Republic where non-deductible interest cannot be carried forward, the introduction of a 
carry forward of non-deductible interest usually coincides with the introduction of or switch to 
an earnings stripping rule. If a fixed ratio approach is in place, only Poland allows for a carry 
forward of non-deductible interest since 2015. 
Interest deduction limitation rules may play a much more important role in the future. On 20 
June 2016, the European Council adopted the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD) as part 
of the Commission’s Anti-Tax Avoidance Package (ATAP). Article (Art.) 4 of the ATAD 
provides for an interest deduction limitation rule in the spirit of an earnings stripping rule. In 
the near future, the compulsory adoption of the earnings stripping rule as set out in Art. 4 of the 
ATAD and the associated base broadening effect will be especially relevant for the six EU-15 
and five EU-10 Member States that – despite the above-mentioned developments – do not yet 
have a general interest deduction limitation rule in place. Although according to Art. 11(1) of 
the ATAD, all Member States will have to comply with the rules set out in the ATAD until 31 
                                                 
28 The trend towards the introduction of (stricter) interest deduction limitation rules in the EU-15 Member States may 
result from the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) ruling in the Lankhorst-Hohorst case (C-324/00) in 2002. As a 
consequence, not only Germany but also many other Member States had to adapt their interest deduction limitation 
rules. Whereas prior to the ruling, interest deductibility was usually only limited with regard to internal debt and 
foreign investments in many Member States, the rules have subsequently become stricter and more comprehensive. 
29 Under the new rules, the threshold applies with regard to the borrower’s equity, not to the share capital as provided 
under the old rules. 
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December 2018, there is a longer transitional period for Member States with rules that are 
“equally effective to the interest limitation rule set out in [the] Directive”.30 
Similar to the broad reasoning behind the implementation of interest deduction limitation rules, 
attempts to limit the deductibility of certain royalty payments have recently been made. The 
German legislator, for instance, has proposed a unilateral measure to at least partially deny the 
tax deductibility of royalty payments to a foreign entity with an IP box regime that does not 
comply with the so-called modified nexus approach as established within the framework of the 
OECD’s initiative against Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS).31 In Austria, a comparable 
rule has already been in place since 2014.32 It seems probable that other countries will adopt 
similar restrictions in the near future33 which – as shown above for the case of interest deduction 
limitation rules – may have an additional tax base broadening effect. 
 
2.1.4. Loss Compensation Rules 
In case a corporation incurs losses, there is usually no immediate loss compensation by means 
of a tax refund. Rather, losses can be set off against future or past profits (loss carry forward or 
loss carry back).34 Currently, all Member States allow a carry forward of losses. The rules in 
the Member States differ with regard to the amount of loss that may be used in future periods 
(relative or absolute limits) and the time constraints. The introduction of such limits also results 
in a tax base broadening. Moreover, the restrictions might result in foregone losses that cannot 
be recovered anymore. Relative limits for the use of loss carry forwards result in a definite 
minimum taxation of profits.  
Especially among the EU-15 Member States, more and more countries have restricted the use 
of loss carry forwards to a certain percentage of profits since 2011 which can be inferred from 
the development shown in the third graph of Figure 3. In this regard, tax base broadening can 
                                                 
30 See Art. 11(6) of the ATAD. In this case, Member States have to apply the interest deduction limitation rules as 
set out in the ATAD only from 2024 on. 
31 The OECD’s BEPS initiative proposes, among others, measures to counter harmful tax practices. In the final report 
on Action 5, enhanced substance and transparency requirements are established that a taxpayer has to comply with 
in case he wants to benefit from tax advantages such as patent or IP boxes (“modified nexus approach”). The final 
legislation regarding the introduction of a royaltly deduction limitation rule into German tax law has been approved 
by the German Bundestag in June 2017 and will be applicable as of fiscal year 2018. See, among others, 
Benz/Böhmer (2017); Heidecke/Holst (2017a); Heidecke/Holst (2017b); Heil/Pupeter (2017); Schneider/Junior 
(2017) for an overview and criticism of the German rule to limit the deductibility of royalty payments. 
32 See Trinks (2014), pp. 100-102 for an overview on the limitations to the deductibility of royalty payments in 
Austria. 
33 See Heidecke/Holst (2017a). 
34 See Endres/Spengel (2015), pp. 72-76, 98.  
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be observed in roughly half of the EU-15 Member States.35 Germany (since 2004) and France 
(since 2011) have additional absolute limits in place which allow an unlimited use of the loss 
carry forward up to the absolute limit and the relative restriction applies to higher profits. 
Among the EU-10, the amount of loss carry forward has always been limited to 50% of profits 
in Poland from 1998 through 2015. In addition, restrictions are only implemented in Hungary, 
Lithuania and Slovenia. As a consequence, the amount of loss carry forward is limited in 
roughly half of the EU-25 Member States with corresponding splits also within both subgroups. 
At the same time, however, several Member States have extended the allowable carry forward 
periods. The switch to a carry forward without restrictions in time in Italy and Spain and the 
extension of the allowable period in Portugal (from six to twelve years) coincides with the 
introduction of a relative limit to the carry forward amount. Among the EU-10, restrictions to 
the carry forward period are also abolished in Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia. In contrast, a few 
Member States introduce new time restrictions for the use of loss carry forwards. Whereas 
among the EU-15 this is only the case in the Netherlands, among the EU-10, such restrictions 
are introduced in Cyprus and Hungary. 
In general, the availability of a loss carry back is much less common. Only five of the EU-15 
Member States (France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) allow 
corporate taxpayers to carry back losses and set them off against previous years’ profits between 
1998 and 2015. Also in terms of a loss carry back, a tendency towards tax base broadening can 
be identified: Most Member States tighten the rules for loss carry backward in limiting the 
maximum carry back period from three years (France, the Netherlands) or two years (Germany) 
respectively to only one year. 
 
2.1.5. Further Tax Base Rules: Notional Interest Deduction and Deductibility of 
Other Taxes 
In the following, the development of two additional categories of tax base rules will be 
considered: the notional interest deduction and the deductibility of other taxes as both categories 
can have a major impact on the corporate tax base.  
                                                 
35 The amount of loss carry forward has been limited in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain. 
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A notional interest deduction represents one way to mitigate the so-called debt bias by granting 
a notional deduction for the cost of equity.36 In contrast to the previously considered rules, the 
introduction of a notional interest deduction has a tax base narrowing effect.37 From 1998 
through 2015, only single Member States have implemented corresponding rules. Among the 
EU-15, Belgium and Italy introduced a notional interest deduction in 2007 and 2011, 
respectively. Although the introduction of a notional interest deduction was – among others – 
motivated by the achievement of an equal treatment of debt and equity in both countries, their 
respective design differs considerably.38 Belgium allows the deduction for all equity whereas 
the Italian rule only offers the deduction on an incremental basis with a fixed reference year. 
Furthermore, in 1998, Italy had a dual income tax in place that had a similar effect.39 Among 
the EU-10 Member States, a notional interest deduction was temporarily in place in Latvia 
between 2009 and 2013 and it was introduced in Cyprus in 2015. 
The alleviation of the debt bias might be much more popular in the near future as a notional 
interest deduction is an integral part of the draft directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base 
(CCTB) proposed by the European Commission in October 2016 (Allowance for Growth and 
Investment, “AGI”).40 Once adopted, this element of the directive would induce a base 
narrowing effect in all Member States. 
Another way to achieve broader (narrower) corporate income tax bases is to deny (allow) the 
tax deductibility of other taxes such as real estate taxes or local profit taxes.41 It depends on the 
specific characteristics of these additional taxes whether the deductibility or non-deductibility 
has a major impact on the tax base. In this regard, only few changes are observed: In 
Luxembourg (2002) and Germany (2009), the deductibility of local profit taxes is completely 
denied. In Portugal, real estate taxes are not deductible from the corporate income tax base 
between 2002 and 2013, which also leads to broader corporate income tax bases. In contrast, 
the corporate income tax base is narrowed in Italy in 2009 through the introduction of a partial 
percentage deduction for local profit and real estate taxes. Among the EU-10 Member States, 
tax bases are broadened in Hungary as the deductibility of local profit taxes is limited (2011) 
whereas they become narrower in Cyprus through the deductibility of payroll taxes as of 2013.  
                                                 
36 See Devereux/Freeman (1991), pp. 2-4. 
37 See Bond (2000), p. 172. 
38 See Zangari (2014) for an overview on the design of the notional interest deduction in Belgium and Italy. 
39 See Panteghini et al. (2012), p. 17. 
40 See European Commission (2016a), pp. 10, 27-28.  
41 An overview of changes in the structures of real estate taxes and important local (profit) taxes is presented in 
section 3 below. 
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2.1.6. Intermediate Conclusion 
The preceding analysis of the tax base structures in the EU-25 Member States from 1998 
through 2015 has revealed important insights. Whereas country practice hardly changes with 
respect to depreciation rules, we find that other tax base provisions such as interest deduction 
limitation and loss compensation rules have considerably gained in importance and have 
become more relevant drivers of tax base broadening in the EU-15 and EU-10 Member States 
especially since 2007. In contrast, base narrowing policies such as the introduction of a notional 
interest deduction are not very common during the observed period.  
The main channels for tax base broadening which have been identified in our analysis can have 
much severe consequences than depreciation rules for corporations. Different depreciation 
schemes will only induce timing effects; however, costs incurred may be fully deducted. With 
regard to loss compensation rules and interest deduction limitation rules, the ultimate tax 
deductibility may be (partially) refused depending on the financing structure or profitability of 
a firm. Corporate income tax would thus not be based on pure net profits anymore resulting in 
an indirect substance taxation.42 Corporations run the risk of losing interest expenses or loss 
carry forwards as potential deductions in case their economic situation does not change or upon 
changes of control.43  
 
2.2. Trends in Corporate Tax Rates 
After the description of the corporate income tax base rules over time, the trends in corporate 
income tax rates have to be analysed. Therefore, the development of average effective 
corporate income tax rates in the EU Member States is visualized in Table 1 below. The rates 
refer to the top marginal corporate income tax rates at federal level. Applicable surcharges 
that have the same base as the corporate income tax are included; local income taxes such as 
the German trade tax are excluded since they are subject to a separate analysis (see section 3 
below). 
  
                                                 
42 See Spengel et al. (2010), p. 19.  
43 See Spengel et al. (2010), pp. 24-27.  
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Table 1: Average Effective Corporate Income Tax Rates in the EU-15 and EU-10 
Member States 
 1998 2002 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 
EU-15 35.1% 31.0% 28.4% 27.1% 25.6% 25.2% 25.4% 24.8% 
EU-10 - - 20.4% 20.5% 20.0% 19.2% 19.6% 19.4% 
         Source: Own calculations 
During the period of our analysis, average effective corporate income tax rates decrease in both 
subgroups with a much more pronounced effect among the EU-15 Member States. There, tax 
rates decrease on average by 10.3 percentage points between 1998 and 2015 (by 3.6 percentage 
points between 2005 and 2015) in contrast to an average decrease of one percentage point in 
the EU-10 Member States (between 2005 and 2015). In general, the overall average tax level is 
substantially lower in the EU-10 Member States, which could explain the comparatively lower 
decrease in this subgroup. 
Among the EU-15, the most noticeable tax rate reductions can be observed in Germany and 
Ireland as well as Denmark and the United Kingdom. In Germany, for instance, the tax rate is 
reduced by 31.7 percentage points from 47.5% in 1998 to 15.8% in 2015. This strong decline 
is caused by the switch from an imputation system with different rates for retained and 
distributed profits that applied until 2001 towards the currently existing shareholder relief 
system.44 In Ireland, the corporate income tax rate of 32% in 1998 is reduced by 60.9% to 12.5% 
from 2003 onwards.45 Furthermore, above-average declines in corporate tax rates are observed 
in Denmark and the United Kingdom. In general, the declines in tax rates are stronger at the 
beginning of our observations. Whereas corporate tax rates decline until 2013 in Greece and 
until 2011 in Portugal, they increase again in subsequent years. This might still be viewed as 
measures to alleviate the effects of the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis in two countries 
that were especially affected. 
Among the EU-10, corporate tax rates also mostly decline, but remain constant in Latvia, Malta 
and Poland. In Cyprus and the Slovak Republic, however, tax rates increase between 2005 and 
2015. Similar to the increase in tax rates in Greece and Portugal, the increase in Cyprus occurred 
                                                 
44 In 1998, a rate of 47.5% was applicable for the taxation of retained profits whereas a rate of 30% was applicable 
in case of profit distribution. When the effective corporate income tax rate was reduced to 15.8% in 2009, the trade 
tax ceased to be a deductible expense for corporate income tax purposes.  
45 Since we conduct a comprehensive, cross-sectoral analysis on corporate tax structures, we consider the general 
corporate income tax rate of 32% applicable in Ireland in 1998 and disregard the reduced rate of 10% for 
manufacturing companies. 
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in the context of measures to alleviate the immediate negative effects of the financial crisis in 
2013.  
 
2.3. Analysis of the Interdependence between Trends in Corporate Tax Bases and 
Corporate Tax Rates 
Combining the results of the two previously separate analyses, we can conclude that there is 
still general evidence for tax rate cut cum tax base broadening policies. To draw country-
specific conclusions on the occurence of such policies, we provide for a standardized figure of 
tax base broadening relative to the percentage change in effective corporate tax rates in Figure 
4.46 The standardized figure for tax base broadening is calculated as follows: For each Member 
State, each element of tax base definition is assigned a value of +1 in case base broadening 
occurs in that respective category and, in turn, a value of -1 is assigned if tax bases are narrowed. 
A value of 0 is assigned in case the respective tax base provision does not change and there is 
neither tax base broadening nor tax base narrowing. Finally, all values are added up to derive 
the standardized figure for tax base broadening. Appendix 1 provides a detailed overview on 
the parameters considered as well as the respective characteristics leading to the different base 
broadening values. To account for changes in tax rates irrespective of their initial level, we 
consider the percentage change in effective corporate income tax rates. 
To decide on base broadening or base narrowing, we compare the respective national provisions 
at two points in time for each category. The periods from 1998 through 2007 (only EU-15) and 
from 2007 to 2015 (both EU-15 and EU-10) are considered as opposed to the long-term 
analyses in existing literature. This split is relevant to distinguish potential effects of the 
economic crisis in 2008/2009 and the following sovereign debt crisis which had substantial 
impact on economic conditions in the EU Member States. Considering 2009 as the base year is 
not sensible as many countries implemented crisis-related ad-hoc tax measures.47 
Figure 4 below illustrates the changes in tax base relative to the percentage changes in tax rate 
for both the EU-15 and EU-10 Member States. Depending on the location of the country data 
points, conclusions on the tax policy of the respective Member State can be drawn: In case a 
country simultaneously lowers its tax rate and introduces provisions that lead to broader tax 
bases (tax rate cut cum tax base broadening), the data point would be situated in the lower right 
                                                 
46 Doing so, we follow an approach similar to Becker/Fuest (2011) and Kawano/Slemrod (2016). 
47 For instance, the availability of accelerated depreciation in Austria in 2009 mentioned in section 2.1.1. constitutes 
such a crisis-related measure. 
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quadrant. In case only one parameter is changed, the data point would be located on one of the 
axes. It would be located at the intercept of both axes if neither of the considered dimensions 
(tax base rules and tax rate) change. 
Figure 4: Change in Effective Corporate Income Tax Rates (in %) in Relation to 
Number of Tax Base Broadening Measures 
 
Among the EU-15 Member States, two different trends can be observed from 1998 through 
2007 and from 2007 through 2015. As evident from the left part of the above illustration, tax 
rates were reduced and tax bases were broadened in five Member States, namely Austria, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands between 1998 and 2007. The effect of tax 
base broadening is especially distinct for instance in Germany and the Netherlands with an 
overall base broadening score of 2 that stems from changes in the provisions regarding the 
treatment of losses (see chapter 2.1.4. above). At the same time, the decreases in tax rates were 
accompanied by reforms that – according to our measure – in sum led to narrower corporate 
tax bases in Belgium, France, Greece and Portugal. In the remainder of EU-15 Member States, 
there is no effect on corporate tax bases due to lack of corresponding reforms.48 Except for 
                                                 
48 It could also be that tax base broadening and tax base narrowing measures cancel out and lead to a base broadening 
score of 0. See Appendix 1 for details on the description and specification of base broadening parameters. 
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Sweden where the tax rate remains unchanged from 1998 through 2007, corporate income tax 
rates uniformly decrease in all other EU-15 Member States during the first period.  
During the second period (2007-2015), more tax base broadening measures are introduced 
especially in Member States where no base broadening was observed during the previous period 
or where tax bases were then even narrowed. Also, the overall magnitude of tax base broadening 
appears to be larger. Tax rate cut cum tax base broadening reforms are observed in five Member 
States (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom). Although Member States 
still mostly reduce corporate income tax rates, in contrast to the previous period, there are three 
Member States where effective corporate income tax rates even increase (France, Greece, 
Portugal). Interestingly, the increases are observed in those Member States where tax base 
broadening is also most pronounced. During the second observation period, thus, base 
broadening is not necessarily associated with lower tax rates. As concluded in chapter 2.2. 
above, this may at least in part be intended as a countermeasure to alleviate the effects of the 
sovereign debt crisis. 
The development of tax rates and tax bases among the EU-10 Member States from 2007 through 
2015 does not provide a uniform picture. Only Slovenia and Hungary simultaneously lower 
their corporate tax rates and implement reforms that lead to broader tax bases. Among all 
Member States considered, only in Cyprus a reverse effect can be observed since a higher 
corporate income tax rate is applied to a narrower corporate income tax base. In half of the 
EU-10 Member States, there is even no tax base effect. This might coincide with the 
systematically lower corporate income tax rates in the EU-10 subgroup: It has been argued in 
previous literature that these low rates are combined with very broad tax bases and restrictive 
loss compensation rules leaving little room for further tax base broadening.49 
Overall, our observations confirm the persistence of the trend of tax rate cut cum tax base 
broadening from 1998 through 2015. Especially when looking at different partial periods, 
interesting effects are apparent in the subgroup of the EU-15 Member States. Although there 
are countries that reduce corporate tax rates and simultaneously broaden corporate tax bases in 
both partial periods, the magnitude of base broadening is stronger from 2007 through 2015. 
Furthermore, reforms leading to broader corporate income tax bases are accompanied with 
higher corporate income tax rates in Member States such as Greece or Portugal that were 
particularly affected by the economic and subsequent sovereign debt crisis. 
                                                 
49 See Jacob et al. (2011), pp. 75-79. 
20 
 
3. Other Corporate (Profit) Taxes 
Apart from corporate income tax, most Member States levy further corporate profit and non-
profit taxes such as real estate taxes, local profit taxes, payroll taxes or net worth taxes which 
can be highly relevant for the effective tax burden of corporations. In the following analysis, 
only the general prevalence and design of those other taxes including the underlying rates will 
be discussed. The aim is to gain insights on whether a similar development as with regard to 
corporate income tax can be identified. For a detailed overview on the specific design of the tax 
bases of single taxes in the different Member States, reference is made to the related literature.50 
In general, real estate taxes are levied in almost every Member State. Among the EU-15, both 
land and buildings are included in the real estate tax base. The respective value of the tax base 
is determined either with reference to market values or based on historical cost. In contrast, 
among the EU-10, real estate taxes are not levied in Malta and Slovenia. Moreover, only land 
is included in the real tax base in the Slovak Republic which results in a narrower tax base than 
in the remainder of countries. In the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic, 
the value of the tax base is determined according to the square footage of the property. This 
valuation standard is not found among the EU-15 Member States. 
Local profit taxes are levied in only five of the EU-15 Member States (France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg and Spain). Among the EU-10 Member States, only Hungary levies a local profit 
tax. Although local taxes can have similarities to the determination of the corporate income tax 
base, local tax bases are usually much broader. In Luxembourg, however, the municipal 
business tax base corresponds to the corporate income tax base since 2011. As a whole, there 
is no uniform development of local tax structures across Member States. A trend of broader tax 
bases and lower tax rates is only found in Luxembourg where the abolition of the percentage 
deduction for property assets leads to a broader tax base of the municipal business tax (Impôt 
Commercial Communal sur le Bénéfice) as of 2011. The underlying tax rate decreases from 
10% in 1998 to 7.5% in 2007 and 6.75% in 2009. 
Germany is the only Member State where the local trade tax (Gewerbesteuer) has become a 
more important determinant of the effective tax burden between 1998 and 2015. This can be 
attributed to two different developments: First, the tax base of the Gewerbesteuer has become 
broader especially since 2009 due to a tightening of the add back provisions for instance in case 
of financing expenses. Second, the increasing relevance can be explained by the interdiction to 
                                                 
50 See, for instance, Endres/Spengel (2015), pp. 160-166, 169-171; Endres/Spengel (2016), pp. 147-150. 
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treat the trade tax as a deductible expense for corporate income tax purposes. This shift was 
combined with a reduction of the trade tax rate from 5% to 3.5%. Furthermore, limitations to 
the use of loss carry forwards within the trade tax also have a base broadening effect. Moreover, 
the average municipal factor rate which is combined with the trade tax rate to achieve the overall 
effective trade tax rate has increased from 426% in 1998 to 447% in 2015.51 
On the contrary, the importance of local profit taxes decreases in Italy and Hungary: In Italy, 
the tax base of the regional tax on productive activities (Imposta Regionale sulle Attività 
Produttive, IRAP) has become narrower with the introduction of a lump-sum deduction for 
personnel cost in 2005. From 2015, all actual labour cost may be deducted which might further 
narrow the IRAP base. Additionally, the IRAP rate is decreased from 4.25% to 3.9% as of 2009. 
In Hungary, the abolition of the add-back provision for 50% of interest as of 2007 leads to a 
narrower tax base of the local business tax (Helyi Iparűzési Adó). The tax rate remains 
unchanged. 
A special development is observed in France where the Taxe Professionnelle was based on the 
value of real property and machinery until 2011 and thus shared some characteristics of a wealth 
tax. As of 2011, the former Taxe Professionnelle was replaced by a new, two-fold local tax 
(Contribution Economique Territoriale, CET) consisting of a land contribution for enterprises 
based on the rental value of real property and a contribution on the value added defined as net 
sales minus the value of inventory. At the same time, the tax rate increases from 23.6% in 1998 
to 25.7% in 2015. In Spain, the local business tax (Impuesto sobre Actividades Económicas, 
IAE) remains unchanged from 1998 through 2015. 
The prevalence of payroll taxes is low among both the EU-15 and EU-10 Member States; only 
Austria, Cyprus, France and the Slovak Republic levy or levied such taxes from 1998 through 
2015. In all Member States, payroll taxes are based on labour costs after social security 
payments. Despite the abolition of the payroll tax in the Slovak Republic in 2009 and minor 
changes in tax rates, it is not possible to identify a common trend. 
At corporate level, a net wealth tax is only imposed in Luxembourg. Apart from the exclusion 
of intangible property from the net wealth tax base in 2009, there are no further changes to the 
net wealth tax base or rate. 
                                                 
51 Average municipal factor rates are gathered from an annual series of the Institut für Finanzen und Steuern (ifst), 
see for instance Andrae (2015). 
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As a whole, no general conclusion regarding a higher or lower importance of other corporate 
profit or non-profit taxes is possible. An important insight from the preceding analysis is, 
however, that the respective tax structures of the Member States remain predominantly 
constant. Apart from the abolition of the payroll tax in the Slovak Republic and a major reform 
concerning the local profit tax in France, no other significant changes are observed. In case 
Member States impose further taxes at corporate level, they predominantly seem to maintain 
these taxes and refrain from major changes. Vice versa, no Member State newly introduces any 
of the taxes considered during the relevant time period. 
 
4. Shareholder Taxation 
The observed decline in corporate income tax rates can be related to the competition for mobile 
investment of multinational corporations among countries.52 As regards multinational 
corporations, it is assumed that shareholder taxation has no effect on corporate investment 
decisions since tax consequences at shareholder level are largely unknown.53 For small and 
medium-sized firms, however, the taxation of shareholders has to be taken into account.54  
Based on these arguments, an additional instrument to balance potential tax revenue losses from 
declines in the corporate income tax rates besides broader corporate tax bases could be possible: 
the increase in personal income tax rates on dividends or a general increase in personal income 
tax rates.55 With a reduction of the corporate income tax rate and an increasing tax rate for the 
dividend income of shareholders, the overall tax burden of small and medium-sized companies 
could be kept constant (or is even increasing) whereas the country nevertheless becomes more 
attractive as an investment location for multinational corporations. 
In case a Member State reduces its corporate income tax rate while the personal income tax rate 
on dividends remains unchanged, the relative share of dividend taxation with regard to the total 
tax burden increases.56 If the total tax burden is supposed to remain constant, an increased 
taxation of dividend income at shareholder level would be necessary to compensate for the 
decrease in corporate income tax rates. The following calculation example in Table 2 illustrates 
this relationship. For simplicity, we assume a classical system for the taxation of dividends. 
                                                 
52 See Feld/Heckemeyer (2011), pp. 234-237 for a review of the corresponding literature. 
53 See, for instance, Commission of the European Communities (1992), p. 71; Devereux/Griffith (2003), p. 115. 
54 See, for instance, Spengel/Bergner (2015), p. 13. 
55 See Grubert/Altshuler (2016), pp. 3-5 for a recent proposal of such reform in the United States. 
56 See Spengel (2008), p. 54. 
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Table 2: Calculation Example on the Interdependency of Decreases in the Corporate 
Income Tax Rate and a Constant Total Tax Burden 
 
 
Base Case 
Reduction 
CIT Rate 
Necessary 
Increase in 
PIT Rate 
(Dividends) 
CIT Rate 
PIT Rate (Dividends) 
40.0% 
20.0% 
30.0% 
20.0% 
30.0% 
31.4% 
Corporate Level  
100.0 
 
100.0 
 
100.0 Profit before Tax 
Tax Burden 40.0 30.0 30.0 
Profit after Tax 60.0 70.0 70.0 
Shareholder Level  
60.0 
 
70.0 
 
70.0 Dividend Income 
Tax Burden 12.0 14.0 22.0 
Profit after Tax 48.0 16.0 48.0 
Total Tax Burden 52.0 44.0 52.0 
thereof: Share CIT 76.9% 68.2% 57.7% 
thereof: Share PIT (Div.) 23.1% 31.8% 42.3% 
 
In the calculation example, a decrease in corporate income tax rates of ten percentage points 
must be compensated by an increase in the dividend tax rate of more than ten percentage points 
to maintain a constant total tax burden. The relative share of the shareholders’ tax burden with 
regard to the total tax burden already increases only due to the decrease in the corporate income 
tax rate. 
When analysing the development of personal income tax rates on dividends, the integration of 
corporate and personal income tax systems needs to be considered as well. Since 1998, the 
widely-used (full) imputation system has been replaced in most Member States by the separate 
taxation of dividend income in a shareholder relief system.57 Among the EU-15, this trend is 
particularly obvious between 2002 and 2007. Only in Greece, dividends have been completely 
exempt prior to the introduction of a shareholder relief system in 2011. Since 2011, all Member 
States except for Ireland apply a shareholder relief system. In Ireland, a classical system is in 
place, which results in a full economic double taxation of profits. Among the EU-10, this trend 
is much less pronounced as most Member States already have a shareholder relief system in 
place before 2005. An exemption is Latvia where the taxation of dividend income has been 
newly introduced as of 2011 within the framework of a shareholder relief system.   
                                                 
57 See Endres/Spengel (2016), p. 145. 
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In the following, Figure 5 illustrates the percentage change in effective corporate income tax 
rates and effective personal income tax rates on dividends for the periods from 1998 through 
2007 and 2007 through 2015 and the two subgroups of EU Member States. For the effective 
dividend tax rates, if applicable, we consider the highest marginal tax rate. In case a Member 
State newly introduces the taxation of dividends, the change is standardized at 100%.58 
Furthermore, we account for reliefs that result, for instance, from the application of a (full) 
imputation or shareholder relief system.59 
Figure 5: Changes in Effective Corporate Income Tax Rates in Relation to Changes in 
Effective Personal Income Tax Rate on Dividends (in %) 
 
Regarding the effective personal income tax rates on dividends, a similar development as with 
respect to corporate income tax bases is observed among the EU-15 Member States. From 1998 
to 2007, there are several Member States where both corporate and personal income tax rates 
on dividends decrease. These Member States can be found in the lower left quadrant. During 
the subsequent period, there is an opposite development in more and more Member States with 
                                                 
58 This is the case in Finland (2005) as well as Greece and Latvia (both 2011). 
59 Exemplary computations for the effective dividend tax rates in Italy in 1998 and 2015 can be found in Appendix 
2. 
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decreases in corporate income tax rates and increases in personal income tax rates on dividends. 
In three Member States (France, Greece and Portugal), both rates increase. These Member 
States have also reacted with broader corporate income tax bases to the increase in corporate 
tax rates (see section 2.3.). 
As for the analysis of changes in corporate income tax rates and bases, the development among 
the EU-10 Member States does not show a uniform trend. In six of the EU-10 Member States, 
dividend tax rates remain unchanged between 2007 and 2015. In Cyprus, Latvia and the Slovak 
Republic, dividend tax rates increase whereas in Hungary, both corporate and personal income 
tax rates decrease. 
As a whole, increases in effective dividend tax rates are also likely to represent a rather new 
option to counter possible tax revenue losses from decreases in corporate income tax rates. Still, 
this holds true only for the EU-15 Member States from 2007 through 2015. 
 
5. Quantitative Analysis of the Development of Tax Structures in Europe 
5.1. Need for a Quantitative Analysis 
For the qualitative analysis concerning the prevalence of tax base broadening, we made the 
simplifying assumption of equally ranked base broadening parameters.60 Although this allows 
to identify general trends in corporate tax structures in the EU-25 Member States, we cannot 
differentiate the impact of different base broadening tax reforms. Moreover, it is unclear 
whether those reforms led to an overall decline in the effective corporate tax burden taking into 
account the development of corporate tax rates and other relevant taxes. Hence, to get a better 
understanding of the overall impact of the qualitative changes on the effective tax burdens of 
corporations, we further conduct a quantitative tax burden assessment. In this regard, we rely 
on the European Tax Analyzer as a simulation tool that allows the implementation of all tax 
base changes (e.g. loss compensation rules) and other profit taxes (e.g. German trade tax) 
analysed in the previous sections. 
In the following, first, the underlying model framework of the European Tax Analyzer is 
presented in short. Subsequently, we will retrace general developments in effective tax burdens 
for the EU-15 and EU-10 Member States for the periods 1998 to 2015 or 2005 to 2015, 
                                                 
60 Based on the underlying assumptions for the qualitative analysis in section 2.3., a multitude of combinations of 
tax reforms could result in the same standardized base broadening value as we assume each base broadening 
measure to account for an absolute value of 1 without differentiating their potential impact on corporate tax bases.   
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respectively, based on the assumption of a large EU-28 average model corporation. In addition 
to the consideration of group averages, we analyse the developments in single Member States. 
Furthermore, the robustness of the identified general trends for the average model corporation 
will be assessed in a sensitivity analysis with varying economic parameters such as the equity 
ratio. 
 
5.2. Methodology of the European Tax Analyzer 
The following description of the methodology and underlying assumptions of the European Tax 
Analyzer is adapted from the explanations in Spengel et al. (2012, pp. 203-206). The European 
Tax Analyzer is a computer-based model-firm approach for the calculation and comparison of 
effective average tax burdens for companies facing different tax systems in Europe. The 
effective average tax burden is derived by simulating the development of a company over ten 
simulation periods. It is expressed as the difference between the pre-tax and post-tax value of 
the company at the end of the simulation period and states the central outcome variable of the 
model. The value of the company is represented by its equity including the capital stock and 
the cumulative net income generated in each of the ten simulation periods. In order to determine 
the post-tax value, the tax liabilities of each of the ten periods are derived, taking all taxes that 
may be influenced by investments and financing decisions at the corporate level into account 
(e.g. corporate income tax, real estate taxes, payroll taxes, trade taxes, net wealth taxes or 
surcharges).  In this regard, the European Tax Analyzer allows to implement all major tax base 
parameters in a very detailed manner (e.g. depreciation schemes, interest deduction limitation 
rules, loss provisions).  
For the calculation of the effective tax burden, the model framework of the European Tax 
Analyzer assumes various types of underlying model corporations based on balance sheet and 
income statement data from the AMADEUS database of the Bureau Van Dijk.61 The following 
calculations rely on a large EU-28 average model corporation based on financial data of 2011.62 
Thus, the assumed EU-28 average model corporation ignores country- and industry-specific 
effects on pre-tax data: As the balance sheet, profit and loss account and corporate planning 
(e.g. regarding production, sales, staff, financing or procurement) of the model corporation are 
                                                 
61 For a detailed overview on the generation of the model corporations, see Spengel et al. (2015), Annex 1, pp. 58-
70. The AMADEUS update as of September 2013 has been used for the generation of the model corporations. 
62 Besides the generation of an EU-28 average model corporation across all economic sectors, industry- or size-
specific model corporations have been generated. However, these will not be part of the quantitative analysis of 
this paper. 
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given, differences between pre- and post-tax data can be attributed to the effects of country-
specific tax rules only. 
Table 3 sets out the balance sheet of the generated EU-28 average model corporation. It shows 
the different types of investments as well as their sources of finance. In addition, the structure 
of the model firm and its characteristics, expressed in common financial ratios, are presented in 
Table 4. 
Table 3: Tax Balance Sheet of the EU-28 Average Model Corporation (Period 6 of 10) 
Assets EUR Equity and Liabilities EUR 
A. Fixed Assets   A. Equity   
I. Intangible Assets 5,199,376 I. Subscribed capital 21,305,895 
II. Tangible Assets   II. Revenue reserves 41,504,474 
1. Land, similar rights and buildings 17,604,472 III. Net profit/Net loss 10,383,662 
2. Technical equipment and machinery 13,320,641 B. Provisions   
3. Factory and office equipment 10,226,065 I. Provisions for pensions and other obligations 0 
III. Financial Assets   II. Other Provisions 8,062,568 
1. Participating interests 11,167,634   
2. Long-term receivables 1,240,848 C. Creditors   
B. Current Assets   I. Long-term bank loans 19,937,409 
I. Stocks 27,361,625 II. Amounts owed to shareholders 22,660,522 
II. Trade debtors 41,937,873 III. Trade creditors 15,709,464 
IV. Securities, cash, deposits 43,890,654 IV. Short-term bankloans and overdrafts 32,385,194 
Total 171,949,188 Total 171,949,188 
 
Table 4: Financial Ratios of the Implemented EU-28 Average Model Corporation 
(Period 6 of 10) 
Intensity of 
Machinery 
Profit to Turnover 
Ratio 
Return on 
Equity 
Equity 
Ratio 
Stock 
Intensity 
Personnel 
Intensity 
23.93% 4.95% 16.53% 42.57% 15.91% 11.42% 
 
The definition and description of the model firm requires several assumptions regarding the 
underlying economic conditions and further planning parameters: 
‐ Expected economic lifetime for assets: 50 years for both production buildings and office 
buildings; 5 years for patents and concessions; 4 years for plant and 5 to 10 years for 
machinery; 9 years for office furniture and fixtures; zero for both financial assets and 
stocks; 
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‐ Depreciable assets are assumed to be run down at the end of their expected economic 
life and replaced by new asset, based on the historical cost of the deposited assets 
adjusted for inflation. Thus, the initial capital stock remains at least constant; 
‐ The goods produced are assumed to be either stocked or sold on the market in the period 
of production, so multi-period production is possible; 
‐ Inflation rates:63 price index for basic material (2.5%); consumer price index (2.7%); 
price index for wages (2.2%); price index for investment goods (2.7%); price index for 
real estate (2.5%); 
‐ Interest rates for creditors and debtors:64 short-term debt claim (1.1%); long-term debt 
claim (2.5%); short-term liabilities (3.9%); long-term liabilities (3.5%). 
In terms of a complete and comprehensive quantitative analysis of the development of the 
effective tax burden in the EU-25 Member States, it is important to further include the 
development of the taxation of shareholders. Within the framework of the European Tax 
Analyzer, the ownership structure is composed of ten resident shareholders (natural persons) 
with shareholdings between 5% and 51%. Apart from a dividend in line with the size of their 
stake, shareholders receive interest income at 3.5% from a loan granted to the corporation. 
Again, the amount of interest received depends on the shareholders’ respective participation. 
At the end of the last simulation period, shareholders receive an additional dividend from the 
distribution of built-up reserves after accounting for taxes on hidden reserves or losses. To 
account for the effects of tax progression, each shareholder is assumed to receive a virtual 
income at EUR 50,000. At the end of each period, the amount of taxes due on the virtual income 
is again subtracted from the overall tax burden. Similar to the calculation of the effective tax 
burden at corporate level, the effective tax burden is derived as the difference between pre- and 
post-tax assets. In the following, we will consider the effective tax burden at corporate level 
and at the overall level, i.e. at both corporate and shareholder level. 
 
                                                 
63 The rates of price increase are derived from Eurostat and the Statistical Office of Germany. The numbers displayed 
are the average of the monthly or quarterly values of 2012, see also Spengel et al. (2015), Annex 1, p. 65. 
64 Interest rates are derived from the European Central Bank’s MFI interest rate statistics. The numbers displayed are 
the average monthly values of 2012 with short-term referring to a period of up to one year and long-term referring 
to a period of longer than one year. See also Spengel et al. (2015), Annex 1, p. 65. 
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5.3. Results of the Calculations and Discussion 
5.3.1. Average Effective Tax Burden for the EU-15/EU-10 Member States 
To facilitate the understanding and to derive some general conclusions regarding the 
development in the European Union, Figure 6 illustrates the development of the effective tax 
burden as the unweighted average across the respective subgroup (EU-15/EU-10) as well as 
with respect to the minimum and maximum effective tax burdens at both corporate and overall 
(corporate and shareholder) level. The effective tax burden is the total tax payment in million 
Euro for the ten simulation periods. For each of the calculations, the identical average model 
corporation has been used. 
Figure 6: Average, Minimum and Maximum Effective Tax Burden for the EU-15 and 
EU-10 between 1998 and 2015 (in Million Euro) 
 
Especially for the EU-15 Member States, the average effective corporate tax burden is 
considerably declining from EUR 62.37 million in 1998 to EUR 46.56 million in 2015. The 
overall reduction of the average effective corporate tax burden between 1998 and 2015 thus 
amounts to 25.3% which is lower than the decrease in average effective corporate income tax 
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rates at 29.3%.65 Thus, it can be concluded that although especially from 2007 through 2015, 
many EU-15 Member States employ tax base broadening measures (see section 2.3.), these 
measures do not even nearly compensate for the tax rate reductions based on the specific model 
enterprise used for our calculations. For the EU-10, the average effective corporate tax burden 
only slightly decreases from EUR 39.64 million in 2005 to EUR 36.41 million in 2015, however 
it even slightly increases since 2011. The structural differences between the two subgroups of 
the EU-15 and EU-10 that have already been identified in the qualitative analysis are clearly 
highlighted by both a lower average as well as a lower maximum effective tax burden for the 
EU-10. 
Among the EU-15, the Member States with the highest and lowest effective tax burden remain 
very constant from 1998 through 2015: Throughout the whole period, the highest effective 
corporate tax burden is found in France. In the context of the findings of the qualitative analysis, 
this outcome is especially interesting for the first partial period from 1998 to 2007 since the 
corporate income tax rate was reduced and most base narrowing measures were implemented 
in France (see Figure 4 above). The lowest effective tax burden can be found in Ireland after a 
sharp reduction of the general corporate income tax rate in 2002. Before, the effective tax 
burden was lowest in Sweden. This switch is only caused by changes to the corporate income 
tax rate in Ireland since there is neither base broadening nor base narrowing in Ireland or 
Sweden. The lowest effective corporate tax burden among the EU-10 Member States is always 
found in Cyprus. The Member State with the highest effective tax burden changes between 
Slovenia (2005), Malta (2007-2009) and Hungary (2011-2015). 
In case the taxation at shareholder level is also included into the considerations, differences in 
the development of the effective tax burdens of the EU-15 and EU-10 Member States become 
even more apparent: Since 2011, the minimum effective tax burden among the EU-15 is higher 
than the maximum effective tax burden among the EU-10 Member States. Among the EU-10 
Member States, the maximum overall effective tax burden (Hungary) considerably decreases 
in 2011 due to the reduction of the dividend tax rate from 25% to 16%.66 Apart from lower 
corporate income tax rates, the lower overall effective tax burden among the EU-10 also stems 
from the lower taxation of dividend and other capital income at shareholder level: In Estonia, 
                                                 
65 See section 2.2. 
66 The tax rate of 16% is further reduced depending on the holding period such that from the sixth year onwards, 
dividends are not taxed at all anymore.  
31 
 
Latvia (until 2011) and the Slovak Republic, dividend income remains untaxed in the hands of 
the shareholder. 
A comparison of the development of effective tax burdens at the corporate and the overall level 
provides further important insights. Whereas the effective corporate tax burden predominantly 
decreases, the overall effective tax burden increases in the EU-15 from 2011 on and in the 
EU-10 Member States from 2013 on. One reason for this contrary development of corporate 
and overall effective tax burdens is – as concluded in section 4 – the enhanced taxation of 
dividends at shareholder level. 
 
5.3.2. Country-Specific Developments in Effective Tax Burdens 
By considering unweighted average effective tax burdens of the subgroups, it is not possible to 
gain deeper insights on potential heterogeneous developments across Member States. However, 
a thorough understanding of the development of the tax structures in single Member States is 
especially relevant when evaluating whether and to which extent effective tax burdens have 
assimilated across Member States over time. Therefore, the effective tax burden at corporate 
level is shown for every Member State and every year in Table 5.  
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Table 5: Country-Specific Development of the Effective Tax Burden between 1998 and 
2015 (Corporate Level, in Million Euro) 
 1998 2002 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 
AT 64.79 64.20 50.95 50.95 50.99 51.08 51.09 51.09 
BE 66.56 66.56 57.17 54.28 54.39 54.39 54.15 54.15 
DE 78.35 65.52 65.78 65.62 52.39 52.84 53.38 53.58 
DK 57.93 51.75 48.59 43.85 43.86 43.86 43.86 41.48 
EL 57.82 57.69 52.75 41.42 41.43 33.34 43.54 49.54 
ES 65.65 65.65 65.65 61.91 58.13 58.13 58.13 55.23 
FI 46.55 48.60 43.79 43.79 43.71 44.15 41.37 34.49 
FR 89.33 82.87 78.53 80.04 80.54 82.99 78.96 75.91 
IE 53.18 27.47 22.20 22.04 21.53 21.50 21.48 21.01 
IT 72.79 73.60 67.98 68.86 57.38 57.31 55.99 52.27 
LU 60.85 51.47 51.47 52.99 49.68 50.12 50.79 50.79 
NL 57.54 57.18 52.16 42.41 42.00 41.49 41.52 41.48 
PT 61.04 55.06 45.52 43.91 43.93 47.34 49.83 43.40 
SE 46.54 46.54 46.54 46.54 43.80 43.80 36.87 36.87 
UK 56.70 54.82 52.24 52.31 49.52 45.97 41.58 36.94 
EU-15 62.37 57.93 53.42 51.40 48.89 48.55 48.17 46.55 
CY - - 20.61 20.61 20.50 20.50 24.96 24.60 
CZ - - 42.74 39.54 33.04 31.55 31.54 31.52 
EE - - 39.40 36.18 34.57 34.57 34.57 32.96 
HU - - 52.25 56.34 56.18 61.10 62.82 63.67 
LT - - 26.46 31.28 33.70 25.93 28.23 28.23 
LV - - 27.37 27.37 24.93 25.84 25.84 27.29 
MT - - 57.50 57.50 57.45 57.45 57.45 57.45 
PL - - 32.65 32.82 32.77 32.74 32.88 32.90 
SI - - 66.00 46.76 34.59 32.95 28.05 28.05 
SK - - 31.30 32.31 32.45 32.45 39.01 37.46 
EU-10 - - 39.63 38.07 36.02 35.51 36.53 36.41 
EU-25 - - 47.90 46.07 43.74 43.34 43.52 42.50 
The highlighted values represent the lowest country-specific effective tax burden during the time period 
considered.  
 
From Table 5, it is evident that the effective corporate tax burden has considerably decreased 
since 1998 across all EU-15 Member States. In nearly all Member States, the highest effective 
corporate tax burden can be found in 1998. Exceptions are Finland and Italy where the tax 
burden is highest in 2002. In the opposite way, the effective corporate tax burden is lowest in 
the vast majority of the EU-15 Member States in the last year of our observation period (2015). 
Exceptions are Austria, Germany, Greece and Luxembourg. Altogether, effective corporate tax 
burdens still seem to decrease despite increasing fiscal needs as a result of the economic and 
sovereign debt crisis. Also, in countries where the trend of tax rate cut cum tax base broadening 
has been identified, decreases in effective corporate tax rates seem to overcompensate base 
broadening policies at least for the large EU-28 average model corporation considered. 
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Although the effective tax burden decreases in all Member States, remarkable differences in the 
tax burdens among the Member States persist. 
Except for Hungary and Malta, the effective tax burden is much lower among the EU-10 
Member States. In general, the spread of tax burdens is lower compared to the EU-15 and 
effective tax levels in all other Member States are close to the lowest EU-15 level in Ireland. In 
contrast to the EU-15, there is no general decline in effective corporate tax burdens and the 
effective tax burden is lowest in only three Member States in 2015 (Estonia, Czech Republic 
and Slovenia). The considerable decrease in the effective corporate tax burden in the Slovak 
Republic mainly results from the abolition of the payroll tax in 2009 and the reduction of the 
corporate income tax rate from 25% in 2005 to 17% in 2015. In contrast, a steady increase in 
the effective corporate tax burden is observed in Hungary which stems from a reduced 
deductibility of local taxes from the corporate income tax base as well as an increase in the 
corporate income tax rate from 16% (2005) to 19% (2015). 
Given the valuable insights from the analysis of effective corporate tax burdens at the corporate 
level, in the following, we conduct a similar analysis for the overall effective tax burden 
(corporate and shareholder level) which is illustrated in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Country-Specific Development of the Effective Tax Burden between 1998 and 
2015 (Corporate and Shareholder Level, in Million Euro) 
 1998 2002 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 
AT 94.44 94.00 84.07 84.07 83.74 83.80 84.10 84.10 
BE 92.82 92.82 85.78 83.61 83.71 83.69 84.22 84.27 
DE 113.89 97.34 93.65 94.80 87.22 88.02 88.41 88.55 
DK 106.24 106.06 104.26 101.39 104.03 99.13 99.02 97.47 
EL 61.83 61.28 56.35 44.91 44.85 70.42 82.96 74.21 
ES 105.37 105.55 101.13 92.80 81.26 100.01 106.56 100.98 
FI 88.83 86.70 87.60 83.17 83.07 83.41 85.05 81.69 
FR 133.24 125.25 121.40 121.86 112.64 119.00 123.20 121.44 
IE 104.02 89.14 86.08 85.99 91.55 94.86 99.33 99.11 
IT 93.45 95.05 90.61 91.64 80.21 80.74 83.68 84.16 
LU 89.84 79.07 79.07 78.09 75.33 77.63 78.97 79.60 
NL 113.09 87.64 83.85 77.98 78.91 78.52 78.54 78.47 
PT 86.75 73.52 66.87 71.65 71.49 74.84 84.91 80.29 
SE 89.95 89.86 90.10 85.10 83.19 83.19 78.33 78.33 
UK 81.70 86.53 84.60 84.95 82.20 92.97 83.51 80.21 
EU-15 97.03 91.32 87.69 85.47 82.89 87.35 89.39 87.52 
CY - - 43.33 43.33 43.23 46.63 56.00 51.49 
CZ - - 64.04 61.28 54.19 53.13 53.11 53.10 
EE - - 41.40 38.01 36.32 36.32 36.32 34.63 
HU - - 90.24 93.39 87.25 63.15 64.88 65.73 
LT - - 47.30 51.40 60.05 53.83 55.68 50.31 
LV - - 29.46 29.46 26.84 40.80 40.80 42.10 
MT - - 69.18 69.18 60.62 60.62 60.61 60.59 
PL - - 59.75 59.89 59.85 59.83 59.94 59.96 
SI - - 102.48 71.96 62.71 61.40 64.81 64.81 
SK - - 33.18 34.24 34.37 34.37 41.43 39.88 
EU-10 - - 58.04 55.21 52.54 51.01 53.36 5.,26 
EU-25 - - 75.83 73.37 70.75 72.81 74.97 73.42 
The highlighted values represent the lowest country-specific effective tax burden during the time period 
considered.  
 
Except for Greece, the overall effective tax burden is lower in 2015 than in 1998 in all EU-15 
Member States. It is striking, however, that in contrast to the uniform development at corporate 
level, the effective tax burden is lowest in only four Member States in 2015 (Denmark, Finland, 
Sweden, United Kingdom). Although the overall differences are in part very small, the overall 
effective tax burden is lowest in nearly half of the Member States in 2009 (Austria, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain). In the qualitative analysis, it has been found 
that an increased taxation of dividends has especially been used since 2007 to compensate for 
further tax reliefs at the corporate level. As evident from the increasing effective overall tax 
burden, the higher taxation of dividends even overcompensates decreases in the effective 
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corporate tax burden for the considered model corporation. In Ireland, the overall effective tax 
burden amounts to EUR 99.11 million in 2015 and is thus almost equal to the initial level of 
EUR 104.02 million in 1998. This results in particular from the introduction and continuous 
increase of a progressive surcharge within the personal income tax in 2011 with a top rate of 
11% in 2015. 
Additionally, the developments in the overall effective tax burden in the EU-15 and EU-10 
Member States shown in Table 6 confirm the clear distinction between the two subgroups that 
has already been identified in the analysis of the average effective tax burden. As for the 
corporate level, there is no uniform development among the EU-10 Member States: The overall 
effective tax burden is lowest in three Member States in 2005 (Lithuania, Poland, Slovak 
Republic) and 2015 (Estonia, Malta, Czech Republic), respectively. However, the changes are 
rather small in several countries and mainly attributable to changes in corporate taxation. 
 
5.3.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
So far, we have considered the development of both the corporate and overall effective tax 
burden based on the calculations for a large EU-28 average model corporation with certain 
economic parameters. To generalise the above conclusions, a sensitivity analysis is conducted 
where single economic figures of the model corporation are varied. In the following, we will 
vary the profitability, asset intensity, equity ratio and labour intensity, respectively.67 
By increasing or decreasing sales within the simulation, it is possible to vary the profitability. 
Higher sales should lead to higher taxable profits and thus to higher effective tax burdens. For 
the asset intensity, we will increase the percentage of fixed assets while the amount of total 
assets is held constant. In consequence, a high asset intensity should lead to higher depreciable 
amounts per year which is assumed to lead to a lower effective tax burden. We will further 
adjust long-term liabilities to vary the equity ratio. In general, higher interest deductions should 
lead to lower taxable profits and thus result in a lower effective tax burden. However, in this 
regard, interest deduction limitation rules could countervail this effect. The labour intensity is 
based on the share of labour costs with respect to sales. For the sensitivity analysis, we will thus 
increase or decrease salaries. Higher labour costs are assumed to result in lower profits and a 
lower effective tax burden. Still, the effects of payroll taxes have to be considered in several 
                                                 
67 A similar sensitivity analysis has also been conducted in Spengel et al. (2008), pp. 62-71 as well as Spengel et al. 
(2015), Annex 1, pp. 68-70. 
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countries. In Table 7, the initial values for the different parameters of the average model 
corporation as well as the considered increases or decreases for single ratios are shown. 
Table 7: Variation of Initial Values for Different Sensitivity Analyses  
 Reduction by 
-30%/-15% Initial value 
Increase by 
+30%/+15% 
Profitability 3.47% 4.95% 6.44% 
Asset intensity 20.34% 23.93% 27.52% 
Equity ratio 29.80% 42.57% 55.34% 
Labour intensity 7.32% 10.46% 13.60% 
The profitability, equity ratio and labour intensity are varied by -30%/+30%. The variation in terms 
of the asset intensity is -15%/+15%. 
  
For the sensitivity analysis, the resulting effective tax burden is calculated for every Member 
State in each of the considered years for each sensitivity model. To reduce complexity, only the 
average effective tax burdens at corporate level are shown for the EU-15 and EU-10 in Figure 
7. 
Figure 7: Sensitivity Analysis for the Large EU-28 Average Model Corporation 
(Corporate Level) 
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For both subgroups, the sensitivity analysis confirms the general conclusions of the baseline 
analysis at the corporate and overall (corporate and shareholder) level. With regard to the 
corporate level, the effective average tax burden for the EU-15 strongly declines, whereas the 
decline is less pronounced among the EU-10 Member States and the effective tax burden has 
even slightly increased since 2011 for all model firms. As expected, a lower profitability and 
equity ratio as well as a higher capital and labour intensity result in a lower effective tax burden. 
The comparatively high variation in the effective tax burdens for model corporations with 
different levels of profitability illustrates the relative high impact of the profitability on the level 
of the effective tax burden. For the variation of the equity ratio and the labour intensity, interest 
deduction limitation rules and payroll taxes may partially offset expected lower effective tax 
burdens for lower equity ratios and a higher labour intensity. An example is the abolition of the 
payroll tax in Slovenia in 2009 which has a much larger impact on the effective average tax 
burden in case of a high labour intensity than in the baseline scenario. Variations to the equity 
ratio show only little effect. This may mainly be due to the low interest rates that are applicable 
within the framework of the European Tax Analyzer. 
The conclusions for the overall level are also the same if the results for the sensitivity analysis 
are compared to the initial results and conclusions. The development over time is shown in 
Figure 8. Again, it turns out for all sensitivity models that the overall effective tax burden is 
increasing since 2011 (EU-15) or 2013 (EU-10), respectively. Similar to the corporate level, 
the variation of the profitability has a higher impact on the final corporate tax burden. 
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Figure 8: Sensitivity Analysis for the Large EU-28 Average Model Corporation 
(Corporate and Shareholder Level) 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
Our comprehensive analysis of the development of tax structures among the EU-25 Member 
States confirms the presence of the often-cited trend of tax rate cut cum tax base broadening for 
the period from 1998 through 2015. It can in particular be identified among the EU-15 Member 
States and especially since 2007. Several Member States, however, have increased corporate 
income tax rates and implemented reforms that lead to broader tax bases to alleviate the effects 
of the financial and sovereign debt crisis. In terms of tax base broadening, we find that 
depreciation rules are less relevant whereas other provisions such as interest deduction 
limitation rules and limitations to loss utilization have become more important drivers of tax 
base broadening. Furthermore, especially in recent years, increases in the personal income tax 
rate on dividend income seem to be an additional compensatory measure for the effects of the 
observed decrease in corporate income tax rates.  
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Ta
x 
Bu
rd
en
 in
 M
illi
on
 E
ur
o
1998 2002 2005 2009 2013
Year
EU-15 Average
30
35
40
45
50
Ta
x 
Bu
rd
en
 in
 M
illi
on
 E
ur
o
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Year
EU-10 Average
Asset Intensity +15% Asset Intensity -15%
Equity +30% Equity -30%
Pers. Intensity +30% Pers. Intensity -30%
Profitability +30% Profitability -30%
Base Case
39 
 
The related quantitative analysis of the development of effective tax burdens within the 
framework of the European Tax Analyzer illustrates that the effective tax burden has 
considerably declined since 1998. Although differences in country-specific effective tax 
burdens persist especially among the EU-15 Member States, the downward trend in effective 
tax burdens indicates that tax competition is still – even after the financial and sovereign debt 
crisis – of current relevance in the EU. In contrast, when including shareholder taxation into the 
considerations, the overall effective burden appears to increase in recent years in both 
subgroups. This observation confirms one of the key findings of the qualitative analysis where 
it was held that an enhanced taxation of dividends at the shareholder level is likely to 
compensate potential revenue losses that result from lower corporate income tax rates. 
In summary, the overall situation in the EU is mainly determined by an intense tax competition 
among the Member States. However, more restrictive loss provisions and interest deduction 
limitation rules as a means to finance corporate tax rate cuts can have severe consequences for 
the effective tax burden of corporations. The sovereign debt crisis has to be seen as a special 
case. In the near future, it can be expected that tax competition will continue. Member States 
such as Denmark in 2016 and Italy in 2017 have further reduced their corporate income tax 
rates. Moreover, the United Kingdom and the United States have announced major tax reforms 
which may also contribute to a fiercer tax competition within the EU. 
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Appendix 1 – Description and Specification of Base Broadening Parameters 
Depreciation68 
+1 Member State switches from any depreciation method to straight line depreciation for a 
certain asset 
-1 Member State no longer stipulates straight line depreciation 
Valuation of inventories 
+1 Member State refrains from the LIFO method in the valuation of inventories 
-1 Inventories need to be valued according to the LIFO method 
Interest deduction limitation rules 
+1 Interest deduction limitation rules are introduced or tightened (switch from fixed ratio 
approach to earnings stripping rule) 
-1 Abolition of interest deduction limitation rules 
Notional interest deduction 
+1 Abolition of notional interest deduction  
-1 Introduction of a notional interest deduction  
Treatment of losses69 
 Loss carry forward 
+1 Introduction of limitation to loss carry forward amount (absolute and relative); 
restriction of loss carry forward with regard to time (if previously unlimited in time) 
-1 Abolition of limits to loss carry forward amount; extension to a loss carry forward 
unlimited in time 
   
                                                 
68 In case changes to the depreciation method occur for several assets, the overall base broadening value for 
depreciation may nevertheless not be higher (lower) than +1 (-1).  
69 Since the tax base indicator for the treatment of losses is measured along various dimensions, there could be several 
changes during the relevant observation period. The resulting measures are added up. In consequence, it could be 
the case that base broadening and base narrowing provisions cancel out and result in a base broadening value of 
0.  
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 Loss carry back 
+1 Carry back period limited 
-1 Carry back period extended 
Other taxes 
+1 Restriction or refusal of deductibility of other corporate (profit) taxes 
-1 Deductibility of other corporate (profit) taxes granted or extended 
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Appendix 2 – Exemplary Computation of Effective Personal Income Tax Rates in Italy 
in 1998 and 2015 
 1998 2015 
Type of corporate tax system Partial imputation Shareholder relief 
Dividend tax credit 58.73% - 
Partial exemption of 
dividend 
- 50.28% 
Highest marginal personal 
income tax rate (dividends) 
46.00% 45.03% 
Surcharge  
(solidarity contribution) 
- 
3%  
(if income > EUR 300,000) 
 
In 1998, a partial imputation system was in place in Italy. Dividends carried an imputation 
credit at 58.73% of the net dividend received which effectively increased shareholders’ taxable 
income.70 The gross-up could, however, then again be credited against the shareholders’ tax on 
the dividend. The highest marginal personal income tax rate on dividends was at 46%. As 
follows from the below calculation, the effective personal income tax rate on dividends thus 
amounts to 14.29%: 
Dividend  100
+ Imputation tax credit (gross-up) 58.73% * 100 58.73
= Taxable income  158.73
* Personal income tax rate 46.00% 
= Personal income tax   73.02
- Dividend tax credit  58.73% * 100 58.73
 
= Tax due at shareholder level 
  
14.29
 
In 2015, dividends were partially exempt at 50.28%. The highest marginal personal income tax 
rate amounted to 45.03%. In addition, the progressive rate was increased by a 3% solidarity 
surcharge in case the shareholder’s overall taxable income exceeded EUR 300,000. Following 
                                                 
70 The amount of the imputation tax credit at 58.73% rests on the assumption that a dividend received from a domestic 
corporation had already been taxed at the corporate income tax rate of 37%. In case a corporate shareholder 
received that dividend, a tax credit at 58.73% of the received dividend effectively resulted in a full imputation. 
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from the below calculations, the effective personal income tax rate on dividends amounts to 
23.06%:  
Dividend  100
- Partial exemption 50.28% * 100 50.28
= Taxable income  49.72
* Personal income tax rate 45.03% 
= Personal income tax   22.39
+ Solidarity surcharge  3% * 22.39 0.67
 
= Tax due at shareholder level 
  
23.06
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